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East Asia is clearly, if gradually and unevenly, moving toward 
regional  economic  integration.  Market  forces  are  leading  the 
process,  as  firms  construct  production  chains  across  the  area 
that exploit the comparative advantage of its individual coun-
tries. Governments are now moving to build on those forces, 
and consolidate them, through a series of formal agreements to 
intensify their economic relationships and start creating an East 
Asian Community.
Unlike  the  European  model,  to  which  they  sometimes 
profess to aspire, the Asians began the current phase of their 
intergovernmental economic cooperation in the financial sphere. 
In the wake of the financial crises of the late 990s, and partly 
to avoid ever again being dependent on the Washington institu-
. On China-ASEAN trade, for example, see Lardy (2006). China has now 
become the leading trading partner of Korea, Taiwan, and many other economies 
in the region.
tions (the International Monetary Fund [IMF], World Bank, and 
US Treasury), the Asians have built a network of bilateral swap 
agreements (subsequently relabeled the Chiang Mai Initiative 
[CMI]) to help insulate them from outside pressure in future 
crises.2 Though the swaps, whose total remains modest (about 
$70 billion) despite a recent doubling, have been overshadowed 
by the huge buildup of national foreign exchange reserves in 
most countries in the region, some Asians hope this evolution 
will eventually produce an Asian Monetary Fund (whether they 
call it that or not), which would provide them with an alterna-
tive to the IMF.
Regional  trade  initiatives  have  been  even  more  active  in 
recent years. At least half the East Asian countries are already 
linked through such agreements, and the linking of the remain-
der is well under way through ongoing negotiations or at least 
official studies. Such studies have been mandated to develop 
blueprints for both a Northeast Asia Free Trade Area (China, 
Korea, and Japan) and a full East Asia Free Trade Area (those 
three plus the member countries of the Association of South-
east Asian Nations [ASEAN], also called the “0+”). Japan has 
recently proposed broadening the group to a “0+6” including 
Australia,  India,  and  New  Zealand,  but  the  countries  of  the 
region have declared the “0+” to be “the main vehicle,” at least 
for now, for pursuing their “long-term goal” of an East Asian 
Community.
These Asian economic integration schemes are not driven 
by any top-down, overarching political decision to unify the 
region, as was largely the case in Europe after the Second World 
War. Indeed, there has been no coordination even between the 
monetary and trade initiatives. The different pieces might be 
2. For a review of the debate over the Asian Monetary Fund and the CMI, see 
Henning (2002).
. The study of a China-Japan-Korea FTA commissioned by the three govern-
ments has been carried out by the Development Research Center of the State 
Council of China, the National Institute of Research Advancement (NIRA) of 
Japan, and the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy. The group 
recommended in 2005 the formation of such an FTA “as a mid-term goal” and 
reaffirmed “an increasing need” for the proposal in 2006. See NIRA (2007). 
. The countries specified their preference most recently at their latest summit in 
Cebu on January 5, 2007.
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joined at some point in the future, and an East Asian Vision 
Group has proposed doing so via an East Asian Community, 
but each is currently proceeding on its own track and seems 
likely to continue doing so for the foreseeable future.5
China plays a central role in all these efforts. It (along 
with the United States) vetoed the original proposal for an 
Asian Monetary Fund in 997, largely because it was a Japa-
nese initiative intended to preserve that country’s financial 
leadership of the region, but has contributed to the strength-
ening of the CMI and has agreed to study its multilateraliza-
tion. It moved quickly after its accession to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) to begin developing a free trade agree-
ment (FTA) with ASEAN, which has recently been extended 
to cover some services, while Japan and Korea are still trying 
to  conclude  their  belated  efforts  to  catch  up  with  parallel 
compacts. China has turned a cold shoulder toward Japan’s 
effort to dilute Chinese influence by broadening the “0+” 
to a “0+6” to include two more major powers (India and 
Australia, who are desperately seeking to get into the act) at 
the perimeter of the region.6
A key question for the United States, and the rest of the 
world, is how the evolution of economic integration in East 
Asia will affect the role of China (as well as vice versa). Will 
it further enhance China’s power by enabling it to count on 
support from the rest of this large and dynamic region on key 
global issues, including multilateral trade negotiations (and 
rule-making) and responses to future financial crises (inside the 
region and elsewhere)?7 Will it foster a set of increasingly close 
and extensive political-security relationships, thereby altering 
the regional security environment? Conversely, and despite 
China’s growing dominance of the region in both economic 
and security terms, will regional constraints limit China’s abil-
ity to exercise its growing national power (just as the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] was once said to be 
intended “to keep the Soviet Union out, the United States 
5. One leading Japanese analyst of the process characterizes it as “regionaliza-
tion without regionalism,” with the latter defined as “an articulated idea of 
creating a region with specific goals in mind.” See Tanaka (2006). Fukushima 
(2006) views the challenge as “how to transform a web into a network.” 
6. One Chinese observer argues, however, that “it is impossible for China to 
lead the regional integration process” because it is a latecomer (far behind 
ASEAN) to that process, has too many domestic problems, and provokes too 
many suspicions from others both inside and outside the region. He believes 
that Japan is also unsuited for a leadership role and concludes that “ASEAN is 
the only qualified driver.” See Qin Yaqing (2006). A similar Japanese view can 
be found in Fukushima (2006). This is consistent with the series of “0+” 
FTAs, centered on ASEAN, that have dominated the regional trade process so 
far. At a minimum, however, China must be an active participant if regional 
initiatives are to prosper.
7. Antkiewicz and Whalley (200) note that “in China, the argument is made 
that (its FTA with ASEAN) may be the first step for China in creating an 
economic counter force to the United States and Europe….” 
. As argued by Frost (forthcoming 2007).
in, and Germany down” and many German leaders perceived 
European integration as a helpful context for normalizing rela-
tions with their neighbors)? Or, most likely, will the outcome 
represent a mix of these forces that will present new opportu-
nities for the United States to exercise its influence but also 
challenges over how to do so?
InItIal SkIrmISheS
There have already been a series of skirmishes between the 
United States and Asian countries over the budding initiatives 
toward East Asian regionalism. Some have been bilateral while 
others have raised broad systemic issues. None has yet been of 
great moment, but they indicate the potential for more serious 
conflict.
As  already  noted, Japan’s  initial  proposal  for  an  Asian 
Monetary Fund in 997 elicited very sharp opposition from 
the United States (as well as China). The proposal was made in 
the midst of the financial crises of 997–9 and was viewed by 
the United States as a potentially fatal disruption of the IMF, 
on which it was relying to counter them. The United States 
has moderated its opposition to the subsequent, and more 
modest, CMI but continues to insist that any such regional 
arrangement must be consistent with the global institutional 
order (i.e., IMF) to ultimately be acceptable to it.9 In partic-
ular, the United States wants CMI lending to be linked to 
IMF programs and their conditionality—which is what some 
Asians want to escape.
On the trade side, the United States has grown increas-
ingly uneasy over the prospect of an East Asian bloc, which 
could  discriminate  significantly  against  US  exports.  It  has 
responded to date in two ways, both of which have already 
produced modest disagreements with some Asians and could 
do so much more widely in the future.
One US response is to counter the intra-Asian network 
of FTAs with bilateral FTAs of its own. After concluding an 
initial agreement with Singapore in 2002, it has undertaken 
negotiations with Thailand (which have now stalled), Korea, 
and Malaysia and has begun to talk about possible initiatives 
with Indonesia and Japan. The potential conflict here is over 
the terms of the agreements: Most of the intra-Asian FTAs to 
date, especially those including China, are of relatively low 
quality in terms of issue coverage and effective liberalization, 
while the United States consistently seeks (even if it does not 
always obtain or even accept itself) “gold standard” FTAs with 
comprehensive coverage and extensive (even intrusive) reduc-
tion of impediments to trade and investment.0
9. Henning (2006) discusses how such consistency should be promoted.
0. A  useful analysis of China’s early regional trade agreements can be found 
in Antkiewicz and Whalley (200). They stress the very sharp differences both N u m b e r   Pb0 7 - 3   ma r c h   2 0 0 7
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President George W. Bush launched the second and more 
comprehensive US response in late 2006 by proposing that 
the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum “seri-
ously consider” the creation of a Free Trade Area of the Asia 
Pacific  (FTAAP),  which  would  embed  the  Asia-only  trade 
initiatives in a broader framework that included the United 
States itself and would thereby avoid (or at least sharply limit) 
any new discrimination against it. The APEC leaders at Hanoi 
agreed to do so, and APEC is conducting studies of the issue 
to prepare for its further consideration at the Sydney summit 
in September 2007 (Bergsten 2007).
China approved the APEC declaration, and President Hu 
Jintao did not comment on President Bush’s strong support 
for the idea at the leaders’ meeting. At the preceding APEC 
ministerial  meeting,  however,  China  reacted  negatively  to 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s equally strong advocacy 
of the idea, arguing that it would undercut the Doha Round of 
global trade negotiations in the WTO and delay implementa-
tion of APEC’s own commitment (the Bogor Goals) to achieve 
“free and open trade and investment” among the advanced 
countries in the region by 200. At the first 2007 meeting of 
APEC senior officials, in mid-January, China posed a long list 
of questions about the initiative. Hence its position on the 
FTAAP is unclear at this time. 
China’s stated objections do not have much substance. 
It is not pursuing Doha itself with any great vigor, and the 
round may fail anyway. It also knows that there is no possibil-
ity that APEC could achieve the 200 goal. Hence its chief 
concerns about the FTAAP idea must lie elsewhere. One likely 
candidate is its opposition to including Taiwan in any trade 
initiative of the type envisaged, although it has been agreed 
(including by Beijing) since 99 that Taiwan could partici-
pate fully in all APEC activities. Another is its preference for 
trade agreements that are of low quality, do not require much 
new liberalization by China itself, and are largely motivated by 
political rather than economic considerations.2 Yet another is 
among China’s initial agreements themselves—i.e., the absence of any com-
mon template—and between them and the much more precise agreements of 
the United States and the European Union.
. This and other institutional objections to the FTAAP idea (e.g., that APEC 
is not a negotiating forum) could be met by pursuing the initiative outside of 
APEC. The United States and the APEC leaders’ statement itself have been 
careful to propose a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (emphasis added) rather 
than an “APEC Free Trade Area.”
2. Sheng Bin (2006) concludes that China’s trade policy priority is clearly 
its regional FTAs compared with the Doha Round or other possible options 
including the FTAAP. He suggests that China’s doubts about the FTAAP also 
include old-fashioned protectionism (“protection of sensitive sectors”) and the 
implied institutionalization of APEC procedures. He also argues, however, that 
“China would undoubtedly benefit from joining (a high-quality) agreement 
and therefore would be likely to join,” although he opines at the same time 
that “achieving a high quality agreement is highly unlikely” (p. 65).
its fear that the United States might thereby hijack and wind 
up dominating the Asian regionalism process (Wu 2006).
Other APEC members, including Japan, have tried to 
reconcile the contrasting views on the future architecture of 
the region by suggesting pursuit of both the Asia-only and 
Asia-Pacific ideas. Most have proposed doing so on a sequen-
tial basis, however, with the 0+ or 0+6 to be accomplished 
first and viewed as a “building block” for the FTAAP. Such 
sequencing is, of course, unlikely to satisfy the United States 
in light of the likely very long gestation period for any of the 
Asia-only configurations. Both the Taiwan issue and especially 
the very different views on the basic architecture of the region 
could produce clashes between China and the United States as 
the FTAAP process unfolds. As with so many of these topics, 
one  will  not  know  until  the  Chinese  view  becomes  much 
clearer.
A  final  Asia-US  skirmish,  also  minor  to  date  but 
potentially of greater magnitude over time, has arisen over 
participation in the annual East Asia summits. Some officials 
of the US government and Americans outside the government, 
and at least a few Asian countries themselves, believe that the 
United States should be invited to such gatherings in view of 
its traditional deep involvement in Asia and its keen interest in 
the topics that the Asian leaders are discussing. Many Asians 
(and some Americans, including this author) believe it would 
be inappropriate for the United States to attend and note that 
Asians are not invited to the periodic Summits of the Americas 
(and  that  neither  Americans  nor  Asians  are  invited  to  the 
frequent summits of the European Union). This disagreement 
obviously carries political as well as economic overtones, of 
course, and could become much more salient if the substance 
of the Asian summits—especially with respect to meaningful 
economic integration in the region or to important security 
questions—was to become more serious than has been the 
case to date.
. Japan’s effort to counter China’s rising dominance in the region by at-
tempting to include Australia and India via its 0+6 proposal is puzzling. It 
would seem more promising for Japan (and others fearing China’s rise) to align 
with the United States in broadening the 0+ to the Asia-Pacific context 
instead. 
At the moment, the “Asian model” 
of trade agreements appears 
to be on a collision course with 
that of the United States.N u m b e r   Pb0 7 - 3   ma r c h   2 0 0 7
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two Fundamental ISSueS
Two fundamental issues, one bilateral and the other systemic, 
arise for the United States (and the rest of the world) from the 
growing prospect of an East Asian economic bloc. Since China 
will inevitably play a central role in the evolution of East Asia, 
these issues will also be of increasing salience in US relations 
with that country. The United States will need to devise a 
strategy to counter both aspects of this new component of its 
increasingly complex relationship with China.
The bilateral issue is “simply” the discriminatory impact of 
East Asian regionalism on the United States. Based on earlier 
in-depth analysis of a wide range of possible pan-Asian and 
Asia-Pacific trade configurations (Scollay and Gilbert 200), 
I have estimated that the United States could immediately 
lose as much as $25 billion of annual exports as a result of 
the initial static effects of the tariff discrimination that would 
result from truly free trade in East Asia (on the “0+” model). 
These numbers could increase over time as dynamic economic 
effects, especially with respect to new investment patterns, are 
triggered. On the other hand, the impact could be reduced to 
the extent that the East Asians exempted “sensitive products” 
and otherwise diluted their new trade arrangements and the 
extent to which the United States negotiated FTAs of its own 
with some members of the East Asian bloc, as discussed in the 
previous section.
The systemic issue is the potential clash between a China-
led  Asia  and  a  US-led  “West”  for  leadership  of  the  global 
economy. China itself is already the second or third largest 
economy in the world and will shortly become the second 
largest trading nation. Supported by a cohesive Asian bloc, 
it could ascend even more rapidly toward a high degree of 
influence  in,  and  indeed  leadership  of,  global  economic 
norms and institutions. At a minimum, it could undermine 
the  functioning  of  the  current  institutions—as  its  blatant 
. A third, predominantly security, issue is that the creation of effective East 
Asian regional arrangements could undermine the US security alliances and 
quasi-alliances in the region. This important topic will not be addressed in this 
brief.
manipulation of its exchange rate is already undermining the 
IMF norm against competitive currency undervaluation and 
producing huge current account surpluses that make it much 
harder for other countries, including the United States and 
the Europeans, to maintain open trade policies and support 
the WTO system. 
China and much of Asia are indeed already offering an 
alternative  to  US  leadership  of  the  global  trading  system, 
with their emphasis on low-quality FTAs driven largely by 
political considerations, and to the principles of the monetary 
regime of flexible exchange rates, through their active currency 
management to prevent reduction of their external surpluses. 
Failure of the Doha Round would discredit the existing multi-
lateral system based on the WTO to a considerable degree and 
provide an opening for such new leadership. The weakening 
in recent years, and related reduction in political legitimacy, of 
the IMF (and its G-7 steering committee) provide an equally 
opportune opening for China and a possible Asian Monetary 
Fund on the financial side.
This is, of course, not the first time that the United States 
has faced the creation of a megaregional economic bloc that 
discriminated substantially against its trade and challenged its 
systemic leadership. The European Union has represented a 
similar case over the past 50 years, evolving from a simple 
customs union at its outset in 957 into a comprehensive 
Economic and Monetary Union. Despite some ambivalence 
throughout this period and sporadic sharp clashes over partic-
ular issues, notably agriculture and exchange rates but also 
several of the EU bursts of membership expansion, the United 
States has accepted and basically supported the enterprise.
There  were  three  fundamental  reasons  for  this  benign 
outcome. One was the adherence of the European Union to 
the GATT requirement to cover “substantially all trade” (and, 
indeed, to go far beyond it) and the plausible argument that 
its economic union created more trade for outsiders than it 
diverted from them. A second was Europe’s willingness, some-
times reluctant but to date always eventually realized, to enter 
into global negotiations to subsequently reduce its barriers 
(and newly created discrimination) toward outsiders through 
reciprocal  negotiations  in  the  GATT/WTO;  the  creation, 
and subsequent broadening and deepening, of the European 
Union in fact contributed significantly to the globalization of 
the past half century by catalyzing the process of “competitive 
liberalization” (Bergsten 200). The most important was the 
overriding US security goal of supporting creation of a unified 
Europe that could never again drag the world into military 
conflict, the cardinal purpose of the European leaders them-
selves who initiated and carried through the integration of the 
continent.
The  systemic  issue...is  the  potential 
clash  between  a  China-led  Asia  and 
a  US-led “West”  for  leadership  of  the 
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High quality Low quality
Asia only Japan’s economic partnership 
agreements and   “10+6” →
China’s free trade agreements 
and “10+”
Asia Pacific US free trade agreements ←Free Trade Area of the Asia 
Pacific?
A fourth factor should be mentioned as well in explaining 
US attitudes toward European integration. That process began 
when the United States was still the dominant economy, as well 
as top military power, in the world. The European Union was 
already well into its unification process by the time the United 
States began to worry about foreign competition, and even 
the early stages of that modification in the American mind-set 
focused heavily on Asia (initially Japan, then the newly indus-
trialized countries as well) rather than Europe. Hence both 
America’s global economic position and the geographical locus 
of perceived threats to it are important factors in understand-
ing US attitudes toward the evolving European Union and 
how they might be different in the case of evolving Asia.
At the moment, the “Asian model” of trade agreements 
appears to be on a collision course with that of the United 
States. As depicted in figure , there are in fact two consider-
able differences. The substantive difference lies in the quality 
of the agreements, with the United States continuing to insist 
on comprehensive coverage, including sensitive sectors like 
agriculture, while the Asian compacts are far from meeting 
such standards.5 The geographical difference, now brought 
into sharp relief by the US proposal and APEC decision to 
“seriously consider” an FTAAP, is that the United States wants 
to  embed  Asia-only  trade  arrangements  in  a  broader  Asia-
Pacific construct to counter both the bilateral and systemic 
implications of Asian regionalism.
5. The Asians including China argue, correctly in legal terms in the case of 
most of their FTAs to date, that they are not bound by the higher standards 
because they are (self-declared) developing countries covered by Part IV of the 
WTO rather than the “substantially all trade” and other criteria that apply to 
advanced countries. Moreover, the United States does not always itself adhere 
precisely to those standards, as when it excludes sugar altogether from its 
FTA with Australia and insists on “yarn forward” rules of origin to maintain 
important protection for its textile industry. Nevertheless, there is a substantial 
qualitative gap between US and Asian FTAs to date.
As noted in figure , there are several possible compromis-
es between the currently polar positions of the United States 
and China. Japan’s proposals for “economic partnership agree-
ments” (EPAs), which have already been implemented across 
the Pacific (with Mexico) as well as within Asia, include some 
of the same ambitious objectives as US FTAs (e.g., regarding 
investment and some services) while excluding some others 
(especially agriculture). An FTAAP could offer an opportunity 
for constructive amalgamation among the competing models 
and the evolution of a new Asia-Pacific template, for trade 
liberalization and eventually economic integration, that might 
differ from the traditional GATT/WTO/US/EU approach.
The arrows in figure  indicate the direction of deviation 
of the Japan and FTAAP “models” from the columns in which 
they are listed: Japan’s EPAs and its “0+6” proposals are not 
always of the highest quality (e.g., largely excluding agriculture), 
and an FTAAP would hopefully be of considerably higher 
standard than China’s current compacts and “0+” ideas. The 
matrix nonetheless displays the important differences across 
the two key variables in the policy debate on these issues.
The security aspect of the issue is necessarily even more 
conjectural, particularly because of the rivalry between China 
and Japan for leadership of Asia. On the one hand, creation 
of an Asian community that eliminated the risk of conflict 
between those two countries, as advocated by former Secretary 
of State George Shultz,6 would be of benefit to the United 
States comparable to the creation of a European community 
that ruled out future conflict between Germany and France. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Sino-Japanese  rivalry—and  the 
absence of any Monnet-type vision and consensus within the 
region that integration is essential to rule out such conflict—
raises profound questions about the prospects for meaningful 
6. In conversations with the author.
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integration.  It  also  preserves  a  temptation  for  the  United 
States to oppose regional cooperation in favor of maintaining 
and seeking to exploit its traditional bilateral relationships—
especially with Japan but also with Korea, Taiwan, Australia, 
and  even  Singapore  and  Thailand—to  balance  China  as 
advocated by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.7
At this point in time, it would be futile to speculate on 
either the timing or the substantive outcome of Asian economic 
integration. It is quite possible, however, that the results will 
be contrary to US interests in several respects: 
•	 substantial discrimination against US trade;
•	 without the mitigating benefits of either full economic 
integration  or  meaningful  political  union  and  perhaps 
even without much constraint on China’s behavior from 
its Asian partners;
•	 and  perhaps  without  a  willingness  to  reduce  its  new 
economic  preferences  through  subsequent  negotiations 
with  nonmembers  (either  globally  via  the  WTO  or 
regionally via an FTAAP or even bilaterally);
•	 increasing acceptance, outside as well as inside the region, 
of  low-quality  and  highly  politicized  trade  agreements 
that would undermine the traditional US emphasis on 
high-standard  trade  deals  along  with  global  rules  and 
institutional arrangements centered on the WTO;
•	 steady buildup of a network of Asia-only financial agree-
ments, and perhaps eventually an Asian Monetary Fund, 
that would undermine the global stewardship of the IMF; 
and
•	 increasing leadership, even domination, of the process by 
China with resulting augmentation of its international 
economic (and perhaps political) clout.
7. In conversations with the author.
. For example, China’s neighbors have a major current interest in apprecia-
tion of China’s currency, but, aside from a few statements on the issue by 
Japan and Korea a couple of years ago and by Thailand recently, they have 
been unwilling to pursue it. It is unclear whether China’s domination of its 
neighbors on such topics would be greater with or without more formal Asian 
economic links.
a ProPoSed uS Strategy
Such outcomes have now become sufficiently plausible that 
the United States needs to adopt policies to try to tilt the 
Asian integration movement in directions that would be more 
compatible with US interests. Fortunately, the Asian process is 
still at an early enough stage that a thoughtful and skillful US 
strategy should be able to have such an impact. Fortunately 
too, some of the Asian countries themselves want to avoid 
creating new sources of contention with the United States 
and would indeed prefer to strengthen rather than jeopardize 
transpacific ties. Moreover, other non-Asian countries presum-
ably share the US objectives and should be willing to cooper-
ate with the United States in seeking to affect the course of 
the Asian process. Working especially closely with cooperative 
Asians and non-Asians, the United States should thus adopt a 
strategy that tries to influence and help shape the pattern of 
Asian economic integration in directions that will promote its 
interests across both the bilateral and systemic considerations 
highlighted above.
An effective US strategy toward the East Asian integration 
movement would have three components:
•	 acceptance and indeed support of the basic concept;
•	 insistence  that  the  Asian  agreements  be  embedded  in 
broader Asia-Pacific arrangements; and
•	 strengthening  of  both  the  substantive  capabilities  and 
political legitimacy of the global economic institutions, 
especially the WTO and IMF, to minimize the need for 
(and appeal of) new Asia-only regional compacts.
An essential pillar of such a strategy is for the United 
States to accept, unambiguously and with articulation at the 
highest level, the legitimacy and desirability of economic inte-
gration in East Asia. The model is US acceptance, despite the 
occasional difficulties and even crises, of the economic (and 
broader) integration of Europe. The rationale would largely 
be the same: the potentially substantial benefit to the United 
States, in economic and especially security terms, of a united 
Asia that would both create more trade than it would divert 
and put to rest the traditional intraregional rivalries (especially 
between China and Japan). These outcomes could strongly 
reduce the risk of economic and especially military conflict in 
the region that drew the United States into three major wars 
in the 20th century.9
9. A similar Chinese view can be found in Qin Yaqing (2006), who argues 
that “East Asian regionalism is not a zero-sum game between China and the 
United States” and that “there is a huge amount of room for the United States 
to play several roles in these areas (of the East Asian integration process).” For 
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The Asian consensus in favor of regional integration has 
already progressed beyond the point where the United States 
could block the initiative unless it devoted major resources to 
the task and was willing to bear the considerable costs that 
would result. Indeed, such a US effort at this time could create 
such a backlash in Asia that it would accelerate integration 
and further encourage the Asians to shut the United States 
out, as well as alienating even its best friends in the region.
The United States could maintain its current wait-and-see 
attitude, postponing any clear expression of policy to see how 
quickly, and in what direction, Asia evolves. Such a posture 
may have been appropriate, even into the recent past, while 
it was unclear whether the pan-Asian movement was serious. 
But the growing commitment of the region to unify, to at least 
a degree in some important areas, suggests that this cautious 
approach  now  primarily  feeds  Asian  suspicions  that  the 
United States is basically hostile to their effort.20 This in turn 
undermines the United States’ ability to discuss those efforts 
candidly with the Asians and help steer them in constructive 
directions. Hence the time has come to clearly articulate US 
support for East Asian economic integration, to create a basi-
cally cooperative framework within which US suggestions on 
the specific outcomes—and especially the external relation-
ships—of that integration will be taken seriously and hope-
fully accepted.2
Second,  the  United  States  (and  the  other  non-Asian 
members of APEC, especially Canada and Mexico) should 
seek to embed any new Pacific-Asia trade arrangements in a 
broader Asia-Pacific framework.22 President Bush has already 
a contrary view, see Gordon (2006), based on judgments that “any movement 
toward Asian economic integration” will intensify Sino-Japanese rivalry, have 
other adverse effects on US security interests, and generate domestic political 
resistance in the United States.
20. See Wu (2006). He even reports “widespread suspicion in China that the 
United States, concerned with possible Chinese domination in (the East Asia 
summit process), was actually behind the idea” advanced by Japan to dilute the 
0+ by adding Australia, India, and New Zealand. He also indicates, how-
ever, that “the attitude that Washington adopts toward East Asian cooperation 
is perceived to have a crucial impact on the process.”
2. There have already been several US policy statements that move modestly 
in this direction. In June 200 Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian 
and Pacific Affairs James A. Kelly testified briefly to the House International 
Relations Committee that “regional cooperation and integration in East Asia is 
part of an encouraging set of trends” in the region. More importantly, the joint 
statement from the White House in June 2005 of President Bush and Presi-
dent Yudhoyono of Indonesia “welcomed the development in the region of an 
open and inclusive institutional architecture that…contributes to economic 
development and prosperity.” Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs Christopher Hill added in a speech in Singapore in May 2006 
that “it is understandable that Asia is looking to strengthen its own regional 
initiatives—and we welcome it.” He added, however, that “we need to think 
hard and clearly about how we can integrate pan-Asian and transpacific forces 
(including APEC)…to determine how the pieces can fit better together.” 
22. Non-Pacific countries that might support the US effort to tilt the evolu-
urged the APEC member economies to “seriously consider” 
an FTAAP, as noted above, and the APEC leaders agreed to do 
so at their annual summit in Hanoi in November 2006. The 
United States should now try to move this process forward as 
quickly as possible, not least because the onset of Democratic 
control in the US Congress means that it will be difficult to 
extend trade promotion authority beyond mid-2007 without a 
major new initiative of this type, especially if the Doha Round 
remains stalled, and because the prospect of a Democratic 
president in 2009 means that it may be essential to commence 
such a negotiation in the near future if it is to get off the 
ground at all (Bergsten 2007). China and the other East Asian 
countries should support these goals, as they would be among 
the largest losers from the turn toward protectionism in the 
United States that would be implied from a cessation of US 
participation in new liberalizing initiatives.
The case for nesting regional economic agreements in a 
broader context is well known. The absence of such nesting 
may induce the smaller grouping to become content with its 
own  arrangements,  including  their  discrimination  against 
outsiders,  and  to  resist  further  external  liberalization.  The 
Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosur) is perhaps the 
best contemporary example of that reaction, as it has apparently 
become unwilling to make the concessions necessary to permit 
agreement on a broader Free Trade Area of the Americas or 
perhaps even a meaningful Doha Round in the WTO. The 
European Union, by contrast as noted, was always embedded 
in an effective multilateral system via the GATT along with an 
exceedingly thick network of transatlantic arrangements with 
the United States and Canada, which effectively countered its 
periodic proclivities to resist cooperation with nonmember 
countries. 
At present, it would be risky to rely on the global system 
to provide such nesting since both the WTO, particularly in 
light of its stalemate over the Doha talks, and the IMF are 
themselves increasingly shaky. Hence the Bush administration 
has taken an important step by proposing an FTAAP, which 
could evolve in parallel with the Asia-only arrangements, avoid-
ing the multiple economic and political risks of an Asia-only 
integration process. It would be essential for the Asia-Pacific 
and Pacific-Asia processes to proceed in tandem, however, as 
opposed to the idea currently being suggested by some Asians 
to create their “0+” or “0+6” construct first and view it as 
a “building block” for a Pacific-Asia counterpart that would 
follow at some undefined, probably quite distant, point in the 
tion of East Asia in the suggested directions might balk at this component of 
the proposed strategy or at least seek to augment it with new arrangements 
of their own. The European Union, for example, might insist on pursuing an 
Asia-EU Free Trade Area, based on their Asia-Europe Leaders’ Meetings, to 
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future.2 To return to the analogy with NATO, in terms of 
transatlantic relationships in the early postwar period, a key 
goal of an FTAAP would be “to keep the United States in”—in 
the transpacific network in this case.2
The global system can still provide a useful context for 
any new Asian bloc, however, and it would in fact be highly 
desirable to imbed an FTAAP in such a system to make sure 
that it too did not become inward-looking. Thus the third part 
of the US strategy should be to redouble its efforts to shore 
up the global economic institutions, notably the WTO and 
IMF. Both are under severe threat at present because of their 
inability to successfully address their substantive agendas. The 
Doha Round is at risk of total collapse, or at least indefinite 
suspension,  which  would  seriously  undermine  the  entire 
WTO system and likely prompt its erosion. This in turn would 
reduce the prospect for diluting future discrimination by a 
new East Asia Free Trade Area against outsiders through the 
traditional approach of multilateral liberalizing negotiations 
(as well as increase the incentive for the Asians to create an 
East Asia Free Trade Area in the first place). The Fund has 
proven  totally  impotent—especially  vis-à-vis  the  Asian 
surplus countries, most notably China with its substantially 
undervalued  exchange  rate  and  massive  intervention  to 
maintain that undervaluation—in addressing the huge trade 
imbalances and currency misalignments that it acknowledges 
are a major threat to the world economy.
Even  more  fundamentally,  the  political  legitimacy  of 
both institutions is under intense challenge. Both have tradi-
tionally been dominated by the United States and the Euro-
pean nations that created them in the immediate aftermath 
of the Second World War. Both have been slow to adapt to 
the radical shift in global economic power deriving from the 
dramatic growth of Asia over the past few decades. The IMF 
has proved to be particularly rigid, in light of its more highly 
articulated quota system and voting structure, as opposed to 
the consensus nature and one country–one vote approach of 
the WTO (Truman 2006). The Fund is now seeking to realign 
2. Wu (2006) in fact argues that “a vigorous APEC can contribute to the 
development of an East Asian Community” through the standard logic of 
competitive liberalization. APEC’s adoption of its initial trade liberalization 
goals in the early 990s clearly energized ASEAN to attempt to accelerate its 
own integration process.
2. The most authoritative Chinese statement to date on these issues 
concludes that “If the FTAAP unfortunately fails…China would continue to 
pursue its building of an RTA/FTA network (and would) launch more RTAs/
FTAs with other countries such as Brazil, Mexico and Russia. Particularly, 
it is highly likely that China will promote the establishment of an EAFTA.” 
The paper recognizes that “All these outcomes will exacerbate the US-China 
confrontation in APEC” though also acknowledging that China might “join 
the FTAAP at a later time” if it proceeded without China at the start. See 
Sheng Bin (2006).
its governance arrangements to provide a larger role for China 
and other Asian countries but the Europeans, who would have 
to give up most of the representation that needs to shift to 
Asia, are resisting tenaciously. In the WTO, Japan continues 
to participate periodically in the de facto steering committee 
of six or seven key countries, but China, pleading its “new 
member” status, has declined that responsibility, and no other 
East Asians are centrally involved.
The United States has a major interest in maintaining 
the systemic primacy of these global institutions. It has been 
making modest efforts to address the problems cited here, 
but the priority it has attached to them, including the Doha 
Round, has been limited. The importance of preventing the 
potentially adverse implications that could flow from the emer-
gence of a new Asian bloc should add considerable urgency 
and emphasis to this US policy effort over the period ahead. If 
the global institutions continue to weaken, East Asian integra-
tion will probably accelerate, and the risk of conflict with the 
United States will rise further.
ConCluSIon
As  with  many  of  the  other  key  issues  on  the  US-China 
agenda at this time, as analyzed in Bergsten et al. (2006), the 
impact of China’s regional participation and initiatives raises 
more questions than it answers. Creation of an Asian bloc 
could  significantly  augment  Chinese  economic  power  and 
perhaps its global political clout as well if the new economic 
arrangements indeed turn out to carry broader implications, 
though  it  could  also  constrain  Chinese  behavior  through 
moderating pressures from its neighbors. An Asian bloc could 
have positive effects on the world economy, by accelerating 
trade liberalization and providing additional financial resources 
to counter international monetary disturbances, or it could 
divert substantial amounts of trade and dilute future efforts 
to stabilize the financial system—thus adding to the backlash 
against globalization in the United States and other non-Asian 
countries. China and Japan could use the Asian integration 
dynamic to limit or at least contain their rivalry, reducing the 
risk of future conflict for the United States as well as for the 
region itself, or that integration dynamic could become a new 
The United States...should seek 
to embed any new Pacific-Asia 
trade arrangements in a broader 
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source of tension between the two that heightens their mutual 
suspicion and even hostility.
Given these uncertainties in the outlook, and regarding 
China’s real intentions, the United States should proceed here, 
as with other aspects of China policy, by trying to tilt the 
outcomes in directions that would support its own interests 
as well as the global system more broadly. In this case, such a 
policy must focus on the evolution of Asian integration itself 
and the desirability of persuading its participants to move in 
directions that are both open in economic terms and consistent 
with an effective global order. This does not mean that China 
and Asia should be expected to uncritically accept existing US 
and international norms. They may indeed bring important 
and valuable ideas to the construction of a “new international 
architecture”  that  would  provide  renewed  dynamism  to 
the multilateral framework, which has been faltering in its 
efforts to keep pace with the rapid changes in the agenda and 
geographic composition of the world economy itself.
It is clear, however, that the time has come for the United 
States to take seriously the likely construction of new Asian 
economic arrangements since these arrangements could well 
have important consequences for the United States itself and 
for global economic (and possibly political) patterns and insti-
tutions. The United States must therefore devise a coherent 
strategy to respond to this evolution, in terms of its relation-
ship with China (which will inevitably dominate the Asian 
movement) as well as with the region as a whole. This topic 
needs to be added to the list of issues to be addressed in the 
Strategic  Economic  Dialogue  and  other  ongoing  efforts  to 
deal constructively with the China–United States relationship 
and its impact on the world economy.N u m b e r   Pb0 7 - 3   ma r c h   2 0 0 7
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